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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

8
9 SmartTray International LLC,

No. CV-23-00831-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiff,

ORDER

11 v.

12 Astronics Advanced Electronics Systems
13 Corporation,

14 Defendant.

15 Before the Court is Defendant Astronics Advanced Electronics Systems Corporation’s
16 (“AES”) partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff SmartTray International LLC’s (“SmartTray”)
17 Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
18 Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 25.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 32, 40), and the Court
19 heard oral arguments on March 7, 2024 (Doc. 70). For the following reasons, the Court
20 grants AES’s motion.

21 **I. Background**

22 SmartTray holds various patents for personal electronic device holders used in seats
23 and tray tables in aviation and other forms of transportation. (Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 4-5.) On April
24 6, 2015, SmartTray and AES entered a License Agreement giving AES exclusive licensing
25 rights to manufacture, advertise, sublicense, and sell products under those patents. (Doc
26 51-1 at 2.)

27 The License Agreement included an initial fee for exclusivity and provided for the
28 payment of royalties, expressed both as an amount per product and as Minimum Royalties

1 required to retain exclusivity. (*Id.* at 3-5). If AES had not yet paid half the Minimum
 2 Royalty by June 30 of each year, it had the option to make up the difference and pay a
 3 “Half-Annual Catch-Up Amount” to retain exclusivity for the rest of the calendar year. (*Id.*
 4 at 4.) If AES “elect[ed]” not to pay the “catch-up” amount, the parties were to “use their
 5 best efforts to reach a compromise,” or the license would revert to a non-exclusive license.
 6 (*Id.*) The same structure applied should payments not meet the Minimum Royalties by the
 7 end of the calendar year. (*Id.* at 4-5.)

8 AES paid the initial exclusivity fee and began advertising itself as the exclusive
 9 licensee of SmartTray’s patents. (Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 28-34.) In 2016, it failed to meet the first
 10 half of the Minimum Royalty. (*Id.* at ¶ 90.) On November 17, 2016, the parties’
 11 representatives met to discuss the terms of the license going forward. (*Id.* at ¶ 45-54.) The
 12 meeting resulted in a list of terms written on a whiteboard, which SmartTray calls the
 13 “Whiteboard Agreement” or “The November Amendment.” (*Id.*) Those terms included
 14 shifting the Minimum Royalties forward by one year and payments by AES of \$65,000 per
 15 month throughout 2017 and a lump sum of \$460,000 on January 1, 2018. (*Id.* at ¶ 49-52.)
 16 These terms were outlined in a slide deck but were never formalized in a document. (Doc.
 17 51 at ¶¶ 45-54.) AES did not pay either amount but nonetheless continued to hold itself out
 18 as the exclusive licensee of SmartTray’s products. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 79-89.)

19 In May 2017, SmartTray and AES met and formally amended the License
 20 Agreement in a document titled “Amendment No. 1.” (*Id.* at ¶¶ 74-76; Doc. 26-1.)
 21 Amendment No. 1 states that “except as expressly amended below, all other terms of the
 22 License Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect.” (Doc. 26-1.) The
 23 changes were limited to (1) a supplement to the Section 5 provision on sales-based
 24 royalties, and (2) an amendment to the requirements of Section 6, allowing AES to retain
 25 exclusivity through calendar year 2017 in exchange for a “pre-payment” of \$260,000 to be
 26 made within five business days of execution. (*Id.*) AES paid the \$260,000 prepayment but
 27 did not pay the Minimum Royalties in 2018, 2019, or 2020. (Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 76, 90.)
 28

1 SmartTray brought this action in May 2023. (Doc. 1.) The Third Amended
 2 Complaint, filed December 1, 2023, alleges in pertinent part one count of breach of contract
 3 and one count of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing predicated
 4 on AES's failure to make Minimum Royalty payments. (Doc. 51.) The Court now turns to
 5 AES' partial motion to dismiss.

6 **II. Legal Standard**

7 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule
 8 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and
 9 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Cousins v. Lockyer*, 568 F.3d
 10 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not
 11 entitled to the assumption of truth, *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and
 12 therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, *In re
 13 Cutera Sec. Litig.*, 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).

14 To avoid dismissal, the complaint must plead sufficient facts to state a claim to relief
 15 that is plausible on its face. *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This
 16 plausibility standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a
 17 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
 18 *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
 19 content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
 20 misconduct alleged." *Id.*

21 Generally, a court considers only the contents of a complaint when ruling on a Rule
 22 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. *United States v. Corinthian Colleges*, 655 F.3d 984, 998-99
 23 (9th Cir. 2011). However, in certain circumstances, a court may also consider documents
 24 attached to the complaint as well as matters of judicial notice. *Id.* at 999.

25 **III. Discussion**

26 AES moves to dismiss SmartTray's claims to the extent they are premised upon the
 27 failure to pay Minimum Royalties, arguing that Minimum Royalties were optional on the
 28 face of the contract. (Doc. 25 at 9.) SmartTray argues that AES committed to paying

1 Minimum Royalties at the November 17 meeting and that under the original license, if AES
 2 was the exclusive licensee of SmartTray's intellectual property between 2016 and 2020,
 3 then it was required to pay Minimum Royalties for that period. (Doc. 32.) The Court will
 4 address these arguments with respect to each claim.

5 **A. Breach of Contract**

6 SmartTray alleges that AES breached the terms of the License Agreement by failing
 7 to pay Minimum Royalties. (Doc. 51 ¶¶ 96-97.) To plead a breach of contract claim, a
 8 plaintiff must allege the existence of a contract that imposed a duty, and that the defendant
 9 breached that duty, causing damage to the plaintiff. *Nw. Independ. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep't of*
 10 *Lab. & Indus.*, 899 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Under Washington law,¹ when
 11 interpreting a contract, “[t]he intention of the parties must control; the intent must be
 12 ascertained from reading the contract as a whole; and, where language used is
 13 unambiguous, an ambiguity will not be read into the contract.” *Felton v. Menan Starch*
 14 *Co.*, 405 P.2d 585, 588 (Wash. 1965). A court “can neither disregard contract language
 15 which the parties have employed nor revise the contract under a theory of construing it.”
 16 *Wagner v. Wagner*, 621 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Wash. 1980).

17 SmartTray alleges that three writings comprise the relevant contract: the License
 18 Agreement, the terms discussed at the November 2016 meeting, and Amendment No. 1.
 19 (Docs. 51-1, 26-1.) None of these three documents, however, supports SmartTray's claim
 20 for breach of contract predicated on unpaid Minimum Royalties.

21 First, the License Agreement requires AES to pay royalties based on product sales
 22 and separately establishes that continued exclusivity is conditioned on paying Minimum
 23 Royalties. (Doc. 51-1 at 3-5.) By using the terms “option to pay” and “elects not to pay,”
 24 the contract makes clear on its face that AES had the freedom to pay Minimum Royalties
 25 and retain exclusivity, or to not pay Minimum Royalties and lose exclusivity. (*Id.* at 4-5.)
 26 The result of failure to pay the Minimum Royalties is that the license reverts to a non-
 27 exclusive license. (*Id.*) Thus, when AES failed to pay the Minimum Royalties, SmartTray

28 ¹ The License Agreement provides that it “shall be governed by and construed in
 accordance with the laws of the state of Washington[.]” (Doc. 51-1 at 11.)

1 was free to treat the patent license as non-exclusive, seeking other licensees and prohibiting
 2 AES from advertising itself as exclusive. SmartTray's decision not to exercise that option
 3 does not transform AES's option to pay Minimum Royalties to retain exclusivity into an
 4 obligation.

5 In arguing otherwise, SmartTray emphasizes that AES held itself out to the public
 6 as the exclusive licensee of SmartTray products even after it failed to pay the Minimum
 7 Royalties required to retain exclusivity. (Doc. 32 at 2.) As AES recognizes, these
 8 allegations might be relevant to the unjust enrichment claim in Count III of the Third
 9 Amended Complaint, a claim which AES has not sought to dismiss. (Doc. 51 at 15-16.)
 10 But the way AES held itself out to the public cannot modify the otherwise plain language
 11 of the License Agreement.

12 Next, SmartTray contends that the terms discussed at the November 17, 2016
 13 meeting were an amendment to the License Agreement. (Doc. 51 at 7-8.) At oral argument,
 14 SmartTray argued that this alleged amendment reflected a promise that AES would pay the
 15 Minimum Royalties and retain exclusivity going forward. (Doc. 70 at 24-35.) However,
 16 SmartTray's claim that the terms written on the whiteboard during this meeting constituted
 17 a binding amendment to the License Agreement is implausible.

18 Instead, the meeting plausibly is understood as negotiations leading up to the later
 19 adoption of Amendment No. 1. Unlike the License Agreement and Amendment No. 1, the
 20 terms discussed on November 17 were never memorialized in any formal writing. Both
 21 parties are sophisticated business entities with the knowledge and capacity to formally
 22 create and amend agreements, and the lack of a formal amendment strongly indicates a
 23 lack of intent to be bound at that time.

24 Indeed, the parties formally amended the License Agreement in May 2017, and the
 25 text of Amendment No. 1 further shows that no amendment was made in November 2016.
 26 The title "Amendment No. 1" itself indicates that it was the first change to the License
 27 Agreement. Amendment No. 1 further states that "except as expressly amended below, all
 28

1 other terms of the Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect.” (Doc. 26-1
 2 at 2.) There is no mention of any other amendment or agreement.

3 Which brings the Court to the final document that SmartTray alleges formed part of
 4 the relevant contract. The terms of Amendment No. 1 adjust Section 6 by granting AES
 5 exclusivity through 2017 in exchange for a pre-payment of \$260,000. (Doc. 26-1 at 2.)
 6 SmartTray alleges that this was a prepayment toward the Minimum Royalties (Doc. 51 at
 7 ¶76), but this is unsupported by the text of Amendment No. 1. Besides providing that the
 8 “prepayment *may* be applied by [AES] against royalties that become payable under the
 9 terms of the Agreement in the future,” (*Id.* (emphasis added)) there is no other mention of
 10 Minimum Royalties. Amendment No. 1 also explicitly left intact all other provisions of the
 11 License Agreement. (Doc. 26-1 at 2.) The terms of Amendment No. 1 cannot reasonably
 12 be read to render mandatory payments which were optional under the License Agreement.

13 What’s more, even if the Court were to accept SmartTray’s contention that the
 14 November meeting resulted in a binding amendment, the claim that AES breached its terms
 15 by failing to pay Minimum Royalties would fail. Under Washington law, a prior contract
 16 is superseded by a subsequent one between the same parties on the same issues whenever
 17 their terms are inconsistent. *PBTM LLC v. Football Northwest, LLC*, 511 F.Supp.3d 1158,
 18 1173-1174 (W.D. Wash. 2021). Amendment No. 1’s terms requiring payment of \$260,000
 19 in exchange for continued exclusivity through calendar year 2017 and preserving the
 20 remainder of Section 6 supersede any conflicting obligations resulting from the November
 21 meeting.

22 In sum, SmartTray’s claim that AES was obligated to pay Minimum Royalties is
 23 facially implausible based upon the plain language of the contract. To the extent
 24 SmartTray’s breach of contract claim is premised upon failure to pay Minimum Royalties,
 25 it is dismissed.

26 **B. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

27 SmartTray also alleges that by failing to pay Minimum Royalties, “AES deprived
 28 SmartTray of the benefit of the Contracts” in violation of the implied covenant of good

1 faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 51 at 14.) This claim is not supported by the facts as pled.

2 “There is in every contract an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” *Badgett*
 3 *v. Sec. State Bank*, 807 P.2d 356, 360 (Wash. 1991). The covenant attaches directly to
 4 contract provisions and obligates the parties “to perform in good faith the obligations
 5 imposed by their agreement.” *Id.* “It is, of course, possible to breach the implied duty of
 6 good faith even while fulfilling all of the terms of the written contract.” *Rekhter v. State,*
 7 *Dept. of Soc. & Health Services*, 323 P.3d 1036, 1041 (Wash. 2014) (quoting *Metavante*
 8 *Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank*, 619 F.3d 748, 766 (7th Cir. 2010)). However, “the implied
 9 covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot add or contradict express contract terms and
 10 does not impose a free-floating obligation of good faith on the parties.” *Silvey v. Numerica*
 11 *Credit Union*, 519 P.3d 920, 931 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).


12 Here, no contract provision required AES to pay the Minimum Royalties, so mere
 13 failure to do so does not deny SmartTray of the full benefit of performance of the contract.
 14 At oral arguments, SmartTray argued that AES violated the covenant of good faith and fair
 15 dealing because it misled SmartTray into believing that AES intended to eventually pay
 16 the Minimum Royalties and maintain the exclusive relationship. (Doc. 70 at 37, 39-40.) In
 17 other words, SmartTray argued that AES led it on, and as a result SmartTray did not pursue
 18 other licensees as it otherwise would have had the right to do. However, the Third Amended
 19 Complaint alleges only that AES deprived SmartTray of the benefit of the contract by
 20 failing to pay all royalties due and owing. (Doc. 51 at ¶¶ 107-108.) SmartTray may not
 21 amend its Third Amended Complaint by advancing a different theory at oral argument. As
 22 pled, then, SmartTray’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
 23 is dismissed insofar as it is predicated on AES’s failure to pay Minimum Royalties. But
 24 nothing in this order precludes SmartTray from moving for leave to amend its pleading if
 25 SmartTray believes there are other allegations that can support a breach of the implied
 26 covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.

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1 **IT IS ORDERED** that AES's partial motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is **GRANTED**
2 as explained herein.

3 Dated this 18th day of April, 2024.

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7 Douglas L. Rayes
8 United States District Judge

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